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1 INTRODUCTION
In this contribution the Dutch notion of ‘tekortkoming in de nakoming van
een verbintenis’ – i.e. failure in performance of an obligation: hereafter also
‘failure in performance’ –will be examined from a European and transnational
perspective. Only the obligations arising from a contract are subject to research.
This contribution focuses on the relationship between the notion ‘failure in
performance’ and the concept of default (verzuim) on the one hand and setting
aside the contract or termination (ontbinding) on the other hand.
This contribution starts with an exploration of the notion of ‘failure in
performance’ and its context in Dutch law. This step is necessary before dealing
with the two following issues, which are both from a transnational origin and
are relevant for the interpretation of the relevant notion in Dutch law.
First, the connection between failure in performance and the notion of
default deserves attention. The already delicate balance between these terms
in Dutch law is complicated further by the recent implementation of the
Directive on consumer rights, resulting in the new provision in art. 7:19a DCC
on default and written notice in a consumer sales contract.1
Second, the relationship is discussed between the Dutch notion of failure
in performance and the notion of fundamental non-performance – a notion
returning in several jurisdictions surrounding theNetherlands and in practic-
ally all European and transnational instruments regarding contract law. Is there
M. van Kogelenberg is assistant professor at the Molengraaff Institute for Private Law,
Utrecht University.
1 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011
on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC
and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (PbEU L 304/64);
see also Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 2 (legislative proposal) and no. 3 (explanatory
memorandum). The provision entered into force on 13 June 2014; Stb 2014,140.
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any sign of acceptance of this notion in the Dutch jurisdiction, implicitly or
explicitly, and should Dutch law be more in line with ‘Europe’ on this point?
Finally, this contribution pulls some threads together in a conclusion,
focusing on a common denominator which returns when attempting to dis-
cover the positive and negative aspects of European and transnational influ-
ences on national law: language and translation.
2 FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW
2.1 Positioning the term and language problems
Failure in performance of an obligation is a key notion in the Dutch Civil Code.
It is a central requirement for establishing liability in contract leading to the
availability of remedies to the obligee or creditor. The link with liability and
the connection to the various remedies contributes to the legal relevance of
this notion. Consequently, failure in performance of an obligation cannot be
interpreted and commented on – certainly not from a European and trans-
national perspective – without linking this notion to various other relevant
notions in this respect, in particular the notions of possibility or impossibility
to perform ((on)mogelijkheid van nakoming), attribution (toerekenbaarheid), default
(verzuim) and written notice (ingebrekestelling). Knowledge of these terms is
necessary to come to better understanding of the implications of ‘failure in
performance of an obligation’ and how this term and its connected termsmay
be influenced by European or transnational instruments.
First, it is necessary to address a common problem for any research with
comparative connotations. If a Dutch element from the Civil Code or one or
several provisions from that Code have to be translated into and analysed
in the English language, one should be very careful to avoid linguistic con-
fusion.
The phrase ‘failure in performance’ returns several times in the Dutch Civil
Code, especially to indicate which remedial options the obligee or creditor
may have when he is faced with such a failure in performance.2 A concrete
and logical starting point to start from is art. 6:74 par. 1 DCC. This provision
represents the Dutch way of approaching the idea of failure in performance
of an obligation and one of the most logical consequences: damages.
Art 6:74 par. 1 DCC:3
2 See for example articles 6:263 and 265 DCC on suspending performance and setting aside
the contract.
3 All translations of Dutch Civil Code provisions are from H.C.S. Warendorf, R. Thomas,
I. Curry-Sumner,The Civil Code of the Netherlands, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International
2013.
Van Kogelenberg 91
‘Every failure in performance of an obligation shall require the obligor to repair
the damage which the obligee suffers therefrom, unless the failure is not attributable
to the obligor.’
According to Dutch law, the concept of ‘failure in performance of an obligation’
ismore limited than the notion of non-performance in general.4 Non-perform-
ance is a purely objective assessment – the debtor did not or not fully perform
the obligation for any reason. For example, the justifiable suspension of per-
formance of an obligation can be qualified as non-performance, but not as a
failure to perform. The notion of failure to perform is still a neutral term, but
nevertheless more specified. This notion implies that the performance of the
obligation is not what may be expected from the debtor. Failure to perform
implies non-performance, delayed performance and defective performance.5
It may be that the failure to perform cannot be attributed to the debtor – there-
fore the term itself is still neutral – but the evidentiary threshold to be over-
come by the debtor is high.6 The debtor may exonerate himself from facing
the consequences of failing to perform, but he has to prove that the failure
cannot be attributed to him in any way.
The translation used of the aforementioned provision is not without diffi-
culties, because it may give awrong impression of its meaning. The termwhich
may cause a certain level of confusion is the term ‘repair’. This term has two
meanings. The most common translation in Dutch is ‘herstellen’,7 an English
synonym is ‘to mend’. However, an obligation to ‘mend’ is not what the
provision in Dutch intends to impose on the obligor. The obligor is not
required to physically repair or mend the damage caused by the failure to
perform, at least not according to art. 6:74 par.1 DCC. The obligor is required
to compensate the obligee for the damage suffered as a result of the failure in
performance. This is a monetary sanction.8 ‘To repair’ may also imply ‘to
compensate financially’, but it is certainly not themost straightforwardmean-
ing.
However, this linguistic confusion coincidentally points at a strong system-
atic presumption of Dutch contract law, which is characteristic of most legal
4 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/317; GS Verbintenissenrecht, art. 74 Boek 6 BW,
note 2 (Broekema-Engelen).
5 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/370.
6 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/345 et seqq.
7 VanDaleOnlineWoordenboekEngels-Nederlands;http://surfdiensten2.vandale.nl/zoeken/
zoeken.do (18 February 2015).
8 In theory, a creditor may demand ‘performance in kind’, but this exception is still ‘specialis’
of monetary damages and , furthermore, only available if the court uses its discretionary
power to award a specific form of damages. The full text of the relevant provision (art.
6:103 DCC) is as follows: ‘Damages shall be paid in money. Nevertheless, upon the demand
of the person suffering the loss, the court may award compensation in a form other than
payment of a sum ofmoney.Where such judgment is not compliedwithwithin a reasonable
period, the person suffering the loss shall recover the right to claim damages in money.’
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systems with a ‘civil-law’ background. The presumption is that the law en-
courages performance of contractual obligations, because contractual obliga-
tions should be performed (pacta sunt servanda). This well-known maxim pro-
vides for a system which gives the obligee not merely a remedy, but a right
to performance of the contractual obligation.9
The right to performance of contractual obligations is not codified, although
some would say it should be, but the idea is that the right to performance
– self-evidently – follows from the underlying principle that parties are bound
to their contractual obligations.10 Therefore, codification is not strictly
necessary.
In case of failure in performance, the obligeemay in theory choose between
performance, damages or termination. However, the gateway to the remedy
of damages (and, for that matter, the gateway to termination as well, see art.
6:265 DCC), requires the obligor to be in default according to art. 6:74 par.2
DCC.11
In most cases, the obligor should provide written notice in order to put
the obligee into default (arts. 6:81 and 6:82 DCC). Giving written notice is in
fact nothingmore than giving the obligor a second chance to perform correctly.
This requirement underlines the level of significance given to eventual perform-
ance of the contractual obligation. Notice has to be given accompanied with
a clear moment, until which the obligor has the opportunity to perform correct-
ly. If he does not, the obligor will be in default, and only if the other require-
ments of art. 6:74 par. 1 are fulfilled, will the obligor be liable for damages.
Therefore, although the translation of art. 6:74 par. 1 DCC is not the most
convenient one in my opinion, it unintentionally points at this important
feature of Dutch contract law.
2.2 Failure in performance, default, written notice, impossibility and attri-
bution
Following the justification of the requirement of default – giving the obligor
the opportunity to perform correctly – it is logical that the obligormust be able
9 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/380.
10 D. Haas, De grenzen van het recht op nakoming (diss. Amsterdam), Deventer: Kluwer 2009,
pp. 49, 50. Moreover, the ‘right in action’ is codified in art. 3:296 DCC s.1: ‘Unless it other-
wise follows from the law, the nature of the obligation or a juridical act, the person obliged
to give, to do or not to do something as regards another may be ordered to do so by the
court upon the demand of the person to whom the obligation is owed.’ This provision is
more of a procedural nature and, if anything, may indirectly imply a substantive right to
performance of a (contractual) obligation.
11 ‘To the extent that it is established that performance is and will remain impossible, para-
graph (1) shall apply only if in accordance with the provisions of §2 regarding the default
of obligors.’ See also art. 6:81 DCC.
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to perform correctly. If performance has become impossible,12 default is not
required, because it is useless to give the obligor more time to perform.
If a debtor delivers 50 lorries instead of the promised 100, he fails to
perform the contractual obligation. However, it is not impossible for the obligor
to perform and to deliver the remaining 50 lorries. When a debtor has to
deliver a painting that has been destroyed by a fire, it is impossible for the
debtor to perform the original obligation.
The law also provides for situations where performancemay be theoretical-
ly possible butwhere the requirement of default automatically applieswithout
the requirement to give notice (art. 6:83 DCC). In this respect, the most import-
ant category is the obligation with a set term. If the term expires, default is
not required.13 Performance of the obligation may still be possible – the
remaining 50 lorries can be delivered – but not within the term set in the
contract. A theoretical discussion arises on the topic whether the term set in
the contract is part of the obligation or not. If so, one could also argue that
performance is impossible – and default is not required in that case – or that
performance is possible, but default applies automatically. Because legal
consequences do not differ substantially, this discussion does not have any
substantive relevance in this respect.14
Another theoretical discussion is whether the requirement of default and
the term failure in performance are really distinguishable. In other words, can
a failure in performance in the sense of art. 6:74 DCC exist without liability
because the obligor is not (yet) in default? The Dutch Supreme Court rules
that these terms are not distinguishable, because it asserts that the situation
before being in default gives the obligor the opportunity to perform without
failing to perform.15
The connections between failure in performance and default and between
failure in performance and impossibility in Dutch law have been briefly
12 The distinction between absolute and temporary impossibility will not be discussed in this
contribution (see the difference on this point between art. 6:74 par. 2 and art. 6:265 par. 2
DCC).
13 Case law on this issue is quite extensive. See e.g. Dutch Supreme Court 6 October 2000,
NJ 2000/691 (Verzicht/Van Eijndhoven); Dutch SupremeCourt 4 February 2000,NJ 2000/258
(Kinheim/Pelders); Dutch SupremeCourt 4 October 2002,NJ 2003/257 (Fraanje/Götte); Dutch
SupremeCourt 22October 2004,NJ 2006/597 (Endlich/Bouwmachines); Dutch SupremeCourt
13 January 2012, RvdW 2012/107 (Cubeware/A-line).
14 See Dutch Supreme Court 27 June 2008, NJ 2010/ 83 (Moerings/Mol), note J. Hijma; A.C.
van Schaick, ‘Blijvende onmogelijkheid’,Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht (NTBR)
2012/40.
15 Dutch Supreme Court 20 September 1996, NJ 1996/748 (Büchner/Wies): ‘Daarbij verdient
nog aantekening dat een ingebrekestelling niet de functie heeft om ‘het verzuim vast te
stellen’, doch om de schuldenaar nog een laatste termijn voor nakoming te geven en aldus
nader te bepalen tot welk tijdstip nakoming nog mogelijk is zonder dat van een tekort-
koming sprake is, bij gebreke van welke nakoming de schuldenaar vanaf dat tijdstip in
verzuim is.’ Legal doctrine does not agree unanimously with this line of reasoning. See
e.g Asser/Hijma 7-I* 2013/421-422.
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indicated. A last thread in this respect is the link between failure in perform-
ance and the requirement of attribution in relation to the remedies available
to the obligee.
As stated earlier, the obligee has a self-evident right to performance of the
contractual obligation. This right is more than a remedy in reaction to failure
in performance. This right can be exercised not only after failure in perform-
ance of the obligor, but in any case, provided that the applicable obligation
is due. The right to performance naturally evolves from the contract. The
circumstances of an eventual failure to perform are therefore not relevant.
Whether the failure in performance can be attributed to the obligor is not
relevant for access to the right to performance. The only impediment to invoca-
tion of the right to performance is an impossibility to perform, but the interpre-
tation of the notion of impossibility is quite strict, because the right to perform-
ance should not be limited more than strictly necessary.16
In conclusion, theDutch concept of failure in performance has its peculiar-
ities, which mainly evolve from the principles underlying the Dutch Civil
Code. In practice, failure in performance simply means that performance is
not up to standard according to the obligation agreed upon in the contract.
However, the notion of failure in performance can only be understood when
it is connectedwith other notions such as impossibility, attribution and default
on the one hand and with the remedies triggered by failure in performance,
such as damages and termination on the other hand. The next section analyses
two specific sources of influence on the national interpretation of the notion
of failure in performance.
3 FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE: A EUROPEAN AND TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Failure in performance and default in Directive 2011/83/EU and 7:19a
DCC
On a European level, instruments regarding general contract law are in general
not binding, such as the PECL and DCFR.17 In that sense, it does not directly
affect national contract law.
However, the good exception is the area of consumer law, including the
part of consumer law regarding the law of contract. The European Union is
concerned about the position of consumers and strives to protect consumer
16 See art. 3:296 DCC and also Dutch Supreme Court 5 January 2001, NJ 2001/79 (Multi
Vastgoed/Nethou)
17 The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law (COM/2011/635) (CESL) is themost recent project whichwas cancelled
in February 2015.
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interests via Directives, which should be implemented on a national level.18
The influence on national law is therefore considerable.
In 2011, the European Parliament issued a new Directive in order to
harmonise and improve regulations from previous directives concerning
consumer law. The development of the Directive was not without problems,
because the Parliament wanted to adopt a Directive with maximum
harmonisation.19 This objective caused severe problems – an earlier proposal
for a much more ambitious Directive did not survive, mainly because of the
maximum harmonisation objective20 – and the predictable result was that
the newDirective in 2011 did not containmany substantive provisions chang-
ing the level of consumer protection substantively, except for incorporating
a range of information obligations on the side of the seller.
An exception is formed by art. 18 of the Directive. This provision is specific-
ally drafted for sales contracts. The most relevant parts of the provision are
the first section and the first part of the second section:
‘1. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise on the time of delivery, the trader
shall deliver the goods by transferring the physical possession or control of
the goods to the consumer without undue delay, but not later than 30 days
from the conclusion of the contract.
2. Where the trader has failed to fulfil his obligation to deliver the goods at the
time agreed upon with the consumer or within the time limit set out in para-
graph 1, the consumer shall call upon him to make the delivery within an
additional period of time appropriate to the circumstances. If the trader fails
to deliver the goods within that additional period of time, the consumer shall
be entitled to terminate the contract. (…)’
The highlights of this provision are the following. The trader should deliver
the goods within a period of 30 days or within a time of delivery. If the trader
fails to do so, the consumer gives the trader an additional period of time
appropriate to the circumstances. If the trader fails to deliver within that
additional period of time, the consumer is entitled to terminate the contract.
At first glance, the rationale behind this rule seems to be a guarantee to
a quick delivery by the trader. If quick delivery cannot be triggered, the
consumer may terminate the contract. The implementation of this provision
causes problemswhich have a direct effect on the notion of failure in perform-
ance in Dutch law.
18 Art. 169 TFEU.
19 See art. 4 of the Directive. See e.g. A.L.M. Keirse, S.A. Kruisinga & M.Y. Schaub, ‘Nieuws
uit Europa: Twee nieuwe wetgevingsinstrumenten: de Richtlijn Consumentenrechten en
het gemeenschappelijk Europees kooprecht’, Contracteren 2012/1, pp. 11-26; M.B.M. Loos
& J.A. Luzak, ‘De nieuwe Richtlijn consumentenrechten’, Tijdschrift voor Consumenten-
recht 2011/5, pp. 184-191.
20 C.A.N.M.Y. Cauffman,M.G. Faure& T.Hartlief, ‘Het richtlijnvoorstel consumentenrechten:
quo vadis?’, Contracteren 2010-3, pp. 71-78.
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A first hint at problematic implementation is that the scope of the provision
is slightly blurred by section 53 of the Preamble. This section says that
‘in addition to the consumer’s right to terminate the contract where the trader has
failed to fulfil his obligations to deliver the goods in accordance with this Directive,
the consumer may, in accordance with the applicable national law, have recourse
to other remedies, such as granting the trader an additional period of time for
delivery, enforcing the performance of the contract, withholding payment, and
seeking damages.’
This sentence may imply that the rule of art.18 of the Directive does not only
trigger termination as a remedy, but also, amidst other remedies, damages,
but this recourse is only possible if it is in accordance with national law.
Art. 18 Directive is implemented via art. 7:19a DCC.21 The relevant part
of the provision says:22
‘If, in the case of a consumer sale, a seller fails to perform the contract within a
prescribed or agreed period as referred to in Article 9 (4) (the 30-day period, MvK),
he shall be in default if he is given notice of default by the buyer in which he is
allowed a further reasonable period for delivery but still fails to perform within
this period.’
Several authors have already criticized this provision.23 One of the most
problematic issues is the use of the terms ‘default’ (verzuim) and ‘notice’
(ingebrekestelling). Both terms are already embedded in a Dutch context, so
a lawmaker should be extremely careful when using these terms in another
context.
First, a translation issue hides an obvious dichotomy in Dutch law.Within
the context of arts. 6:74 BW and 6:265 BW, the obligee has to provide written
notice in order to put the obligee into default. The Dutch term is ‘ingebrekestel-
ling’. However, in the case of art. 7:19a DCC, the Dutch term ‘ingebrekestelling’
is translated to notice: without the adjective ‘written’. In other words, apparent-
ly the consumermay give notice over the telephone or in person. This situation
causes problems, for according to Dutch law, an obligee can only be notified
21 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 2 (legislative proposal) and no. 3 (explanatory memo-
randum).
22 ‘Komt de verkoper bij een consumentenkoop de in artikel 9 lid 4 gestelde of overeengeko-
men termijn niet na, dan is hij in verzuim wanneer hij door de koper in gebreke wordt
gesteld bij een aanmaning waarbij hem een redelijke termijn voor de aflevering wordt
gesteld, en nakoming binnen deze termijn uitblijft.’
23 A.G. Castermans, ‘Verzuim en ingebrekestelling bij consumentenkoop: de beperkte reikwijd-
te van artikel 7:19a BW’, NTBR 2014/38; H.N. Schelhaas, ‘In verzuim’, NTBR 2013/37.
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correctly, if written notice is provided.24 The term ‘ingebrekestelling’ implies
that the notice given is written. Through the incorporation of the new art. 7:19a
DCC themeaning of the term ‘ingebrekestelling’ is not certain anymore, because
two manifestations of the term now exist in the Civil Code.
A second issue is the introduction of the term ‘default’ in combinationwith
the requirement of giving notice. In section 2 of this contribution it has been
made clear that the notion of default is one with a very specific meaning
especially in combination with the notion of written notice and failure in
performance. One of its features, laid down in the law (art. 6:83 DCC), is that
giving written notice is unnecessary when a set term expires. In this situation,
the obligor is automatically in default after expiry of the set term. Art. 7:19a
DCC confuses this system, because this provision always requires giving notice
to the obligor, even when a set term is agreed upon. The only exception is
when timely performance is essential for the performance because of the nature
of the contractual obligation – e.g. in case of the delivery of a wedding dress
on a specific date. Again, the use of the terms default and notice is question-
able, because of the incongruent meaning of the terms.
A third matter is the scope of the provision in the DCC compared with the
scope of art. 18 in the Directive. The scope of the provision in the Directive
is clearly limited. The obligee has access to termination when the obligor fails
to deliver. As mentioned before, the consumer may have access to other
remedies, but only if in accordance with national law. In art. 7:19a DCC the
connection with termination is not clearly made. This omission suggests that
this provision may also be applicable in case a creditor claims compensation
via art. 6:74 DCC. The European legislator did not prescribe this elaboration,
because now it is slightly unclear whether the ‘national’ default rules apply
or the ‘European’ rules. The aim of this contribution is to establish any influ-
ence of transnational law on the interpretation of Dutch law. Since this provi-
sion has been implemented quite recently, it is difficult to assess the degree
of influence, especially because there is no case law yet. However, a few
predictions can be made.
First, the relationship between the new art. 7:19a DCC and the concepts
of default and (written) notice needed to trigger damages and termination
in general (arts. 6:74 DCC and 6:265 DCC) need to be clarified. The practical
result could be, as Castermans already suggested, always to remain on the
safe side and send a written notice in any case in which the buyer-consumer
would like to get access to a remedy.25 To be fair, the Dutch system of default
24 There are exceptions (Dutch Supreme Court 22 October 2004, NJ 2006/597 (Endlich/Bouw-
machines)), where the Dutch Supreme Court allows other forms of notice, but the law is
clear on this point.
25 Castermans 2014.
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and notice is in itself quite hard to understand: the advice to practitioners has
always been to give written notice in any situation.26
Second, although the national system is not without flaws either, an im-
portant ‘tool’ in the law of obligations to prevent unfair solutions is the applica-
tion of the principle of good faith (or reasonableness and fairness). This
principle is not without significance in the area of failure of performance,
default and notice. For example, notice is by law only valid when it is written,
but in exceptional circumstances, good faith may imply that notice may be
given in another form (e.g. by telephone).27 Art. 7:19a DCC provides a strict
application of giving notice in every applicable case, but in practice one may
want to deviate from this legal principle in exceptional circumstances. The
absence of a general principle of good faith to deal with such situations may
hamper the smooth application of this new provision.28
Most importantly, implementation of the new provision seems to have a
negative influence on the internal coherence of the Dutch Civil Code. The
Dutch Supreme Court aligns the concepts of failure in performance and default,
but the new provision seems to disentangle these two concepts. Avoidance
of these specific terms in the concepts would have been preferable, but maybe
this new provision provides a trigger to review the complete system of default
andwritten notice. Then, the concept of failure in performance will be affected
too.
3.2 Failure in performance, non-performance and fundamental non-per-
formance
According to Dutch law, failure in performance is required to have access to
damages and to termination. As far as termination is concerned, art. 6:265 DCC
applies. It is necessary to take a closer look at this provision, par. 1:
‘Every failure of one party in the performance of one of its obligations gives the
other party the right to set aside the contract in whole or in part, unless the failure,
given its special nature or minor significance, does not justify the setting aside of
the contract and the consequences flowing therefrom.’
For the purpose of this contribution, the focus lies on the phrase ‘unless the
failure, given its special nature or minor significance, does not justify the
setting aside of the contract’. This phrase suggests that the obligee cannot set
aside the contract in every case of failure in performance. As a remedy, termina-
26 See e.g. V. van den Brink, ’Verzuim en ingebrekestelling (deel I/II)’, Maandblad voor Ver-
mogensrecht 2005-10/11.
27 Dutch Supreme Court 22 October 2004, NJ 2006/597 (Endlich/Bouwmachines).
28 Castermans 2014.
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tion is considered to be severe. Therefore, apart from the requirement of ‘failure
in performance’ in general – and default according to par. 2 – an extra thres-
hold is applicable.
Nevertheless, the Dutch Supreme Court decided that applicability of the
exception of minor breach is exceptional and that in virtually all cases of failure
in performance, termination is available as a remedy.29 On the other hand,
it should be taken into account that seriousness of the failure is a factor which
is taken into account in assessing the availability and extent of remedies in
contract and possible defences of the party that fails to perform.30
Most European or supranational bodies of law or legal instruments, as well
as many national legal systems, also recognize a qualified level of breach
necessary to have access to the remedy of termination, but not in the same
way.31 Most commonly, the term ‘fundamental breach of contract’ is intro-
duced. The instruments mentioned all have their own specific provision on
fundamental breach of contract.
Art. 25 CISG states:
‘A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results
in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he
is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee
and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not
have foreseen such a result.’
Art. 8:103 PECL states:
‘A non-performance of an obligation is fundamental to the contract if:
(a) strict compliance with the obligation is of the essence of the contract; or
(b) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what i[t]
was entitled to expect under the contract, unless the other party did not foresee
and could not reasonably have foreseen that result; or
(c) the non-performance is intentional and gives the aggrieved party reason to
believe that it cannot rely on the other party’s future performance.’
29 Dutch Supreme Court 4 February 2000, NJ 2000, 562 (Mol/Meijer). See for a dissertation
on a possible reshuffling of availability of traditional remedies, taking into account serious-
ness of the breach M.M. Stolp, Ontbinding, schadevergoeding en nakoming: De remedies voor
wanprestatie in het licht van de beginselen van subsidiariteit en proportionaliteit (diss. Leiden),
Deventer: Kluwer 2007.
30 See for an example Dutch Supreme Court 25 March 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:BP8991, NJ 2013,
5, note T.F.E. Tjong Tjin Tai (Ploum/Smeets II); T. Hartlief, Ontbinding (diss. Groningen),
Deventer: Kluwer 1994; F.B. Bakels,Ontbinding van wederkerige overeenkomsten (diss. Leiden),
Deventer: Kluwer 1993.
31 M.B.M. Loos & H. Schelhaas, ‘Commercial Sales: The Common European Sales Law
Compared to the Vienna Sales Convention’, European Review of Private Law 2013 (21), Issue
1, pp. 105–130; G. Dannemann & S. Vogenauer (eds.), The Common European Sales Law in
Context, Interactions with English and German Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013.
The practical value of the CESL provisions has naturally declined due to its cancellation.
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Art. III.3:502 (2) DCFR states:
‘A non-performance of a contractual obligation is fundamental if
(a) it substantially deprives the creditor of what the creditor was entitled to expect
under the contract, as applied to the whole or relevant part of the performance,
unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the debtor did not foresee and could
not reasonably be expected to have foreseen that result; or
(b) it is intentional or reckless and gives the creditor reason to believe that the
debtor’s future performance cannot be relied on.’
Art. 7.3.1 (2) Unidroit PICC states:
‘In determining whether a failure to perform an obligation amounts to a funda-
mental non-performance regard shall be had, in particular, to whether
(a) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was
entitled to expect under the contract unless the other party did not foresee and
could not reasonably have foreseen such result;
(b) strict compliancewith the obligationwhich has not been performed is of essence
under the contract;
(c) the non-performance is intentional or reckless;
(d) the non-performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot
rely on the other party’s future performance;
(e) the non-performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a result of the
preparation or performance if the contract is terminated.’
The CESL also contains a provision on the meaning of fundamental non-per-
formance. Art. 87 par. 2 reads:32
‘Non-performance of an obligation by one party is fundamental if:
(a) it substantially deprives the other party of what that party was entitled to expect
under the contract, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the non-perform-
ing party did not foresee and could not be expected to have foreseen that result;
or
(b) it is of such a nature as to make it clear that the non-performing party’s future
performance cannot be relied on.’
Before analysing the meaning of the term ‘fundamental breach of contract’,
it is relevant to note that the different instruments use different terms forwhat
in Dutch law is called ‘failure in performance of an obligation’. The terms used
are ‘breach of contract’ (CISG) and, more commonly, ‘non-performance’.
The CISG tends slightlymore towards the common-law terminology, where
‘breach of contract’ is also used to indicate a ‘failure to perform’. This term
32 See for an elaboration of this term M. von Kossak, ‘The Remedial System under the Pro-
posed Common European Sales Law (CESL)’, European Journal of Commercial Contract Law
2013-1, p. 9.
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does not take into account the notion of fault or ‘attribution’. Under English
lawmany contractual duties are strict. Especially in cases where a buyer cannot
pay the price or where the deliverer of generic goods cannot deliver the
promised goods due to non-performance of his own supplier or for another
reason, in general the other party does not have to establish fault to obtain
a remedy due to breach of contract.33 Strict liability can be considered as the
starting point instead of fault liability. However, it is very dangerous to make
general statements like this when referring to English law, as the bottom-up
structure of English contract law seldom allows one to generalize solutions
and approaches chosen in specific cases.34
The other instruments all use the term ‘non-performance’. According to
Dutch law, as mentioned before, this term is more neutral than the term ‘failure
in performance’, because non-performance can be justified, for example in case
of a justified withholding of the performance.
The general idea is that termination of the contract should not be available
as a remedy without a good reason. Terminating the contract is considered
to be a severe remedy, which on the one hand cancels contractual obligations
of the parties and on the other hand forces the parties to undo what they
already did under the previously existing contract. A small breach of contract
is not sufficient to make termination available, but even a ‘normal’ breach is
not. Only a fundamental breach is sufficient to trigger the remedy of termina-
tion. The CISG, the DCFR, the PICC and the CESL all incorporated this notion one
way or another. The question iswhat fundamental breachmeans exactly.When
is a breach fundamental? As shown by the three provisions mentioned, the
three instruments use different definitions.
All instruments in general recognize that fundamental breach occurs when
the aggrieved party is substantially deprived of the very object of the contract.
The PICC contains the clearest explicated notion of fundamental breach and
devotes explicit attention to the notion of intentional breach as a form of
fundamental breach. However, the importance of this notion is immediately
downplayed a bit by the official comments on the PICC.35 In case a breach
is intentional, but insignificant, the principle of good faith can block the non-
performance from becoming fundamental.
33 E. Peel & G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (13th ed.), London: Sweet &Maxwell 2011, p. 834.
34 For example, according to the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, it can be said with
some restrictions that liability for a contractwhich exclusively supplies for services is based
on fault.
35 www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf, art. 7.3.1, p. 222. See also S. Vogenauer & J. Kleinheisterkamp, Commentary on
the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press 2009, pp. 827-828: ‘The isolated focus on the ‘state of mind’ of the non-performing
party as suggested by Art. 7.3.1(2)(c) should therefore be given less weight than the other
factors in Art. 7.3.1(2).’
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The PECL and the DCFR are also very brief about the connection between
fundamental breach and intentional breach.36 Seriousness of the breach gets
a lot of attention, but this factor is not directly linked to the intention of the
party in breach. It should be mentioned that an intentional breach as men-
tioned in the provisions of the PECL and DCFR does not qualify directly as a
fundamental breach. A second requirement next to the deliberateness of the
breach is that the aggrieved partymust have reason to believe that the debtor’s
future performance cannot be relied on. In my opinion, an intentional breach
by its very nature causes a justified lack of confidence in the debtor’s future
performance. The connectionwith future performancemay therefore not only
be a requirement but also a justification to qualify intentional breach as funda-
mental. In addition, there may be cases where a party intentionally withholds
performance, e.g. because he is angry about another, unrelated transaction.
In such cases the additional requirement may have added value. Although
the wording of the provision in the CESL is similar to the wording of the
comparable provision of the DCFR, the reference to intentional non-performance
is omitted. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the minimal difference in
formulation now implies that intentional breach is also covered by referring
to the ‘nature’ of the breach.
The provision in the CISG does not mention that intentional breach may
also constitute fundamental breach. The definition of fundamental breach
reveals the most important precondition – substantial deprivation of what is
to be expected from the contract, but leaves out several others.
From this exercise it may be derived that termination should not be easily
available, but only in case of a serious breach. The difference between the
threshold in Dutch law and the requirement of fundamental breach is not a
theoretical one. In principle, every failure in performance should give access
to termination.37 The refusal to incorporate the ‘fundamental’ requirement
into Dutch law is not an accidental, but a conscious decision by the lawmaker,
mainly because the requirement was thought to be too vague.38 Although
the available transnational or European instruments show that the requirement
is interpreted in different ways, I am not certain that this argument alone is
sufficiently convincing to deny incorporation of this requirement. In my
opinion, the relevant question should be whether Dutch law recognizes the
principle behind the ‘fundamental’ requirement, in particular that termination
should not be accessible too easily.
36 See for a more in-depth analysis on this point M. van Kogelenberg, Motive matters! An
exploration of the notion of ‘deliberate breach of contract’ and its consequences for the application
of remedies, Cambridge: Intersentia 2013, Chapters 2 and 4.
37 Dutch Supreme Court 4 February 2000, NJ 2000, 562 (Mol c.s./Meijer Beheer BV); Asser/
Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III* 2014/671.
38 Asser/Hijma 7-I* 2013/425 with references.
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At first glance, the Dutch Supreme Court seems to deny this principle by
stating that ‘a failure in performance justifies termination of the contract’.39
However, it is too simple to conclude that Dutch law does not at all recog-
nize the idea behind the requirement of fundamental breach. First, the require-
ment of default already mentioned also applies in order to acquire access to
termination. Default is not by definition a requirement in every transnational
instrument. The objective of a ‘default’ requirement – an attempt to ‘save’ the
contract – is comparable with the objective of the requirement of fundamental
breach. Second, in transnational instruments the requirement of fundamental
breach is not always necessary when the obligee/buyer wants price reduction.
Price reduction is notmuchmore than partial termination, which is a possibil-
ity under Dutch law (art. 6:270 DCC). Third, the provision itself already
excludes the possibility of terminating the contract due to minor failures.
Taking into account this systemic approach, the addition of a requirement
such as ‘fundamental non-performance’ is not really necessary in Dutch law,
if not causing the wrong idea that termination is a last resort option. It is not
the vagueness of the term itself, but the systemic vagueness caused by adding
this requirementwhich leadsme to the conclusion that international ‘pressure’
should not lead to incorporation of this term into Dutch law.
The purpose of this contribution is to analyse whether transnational inter-
pretations of well-known concepts influence the interpretation of a comparable
concept in Dutch law and if so, how. As far as the idea of fundamental non-
performance is concerned, one could say that until now Dutch law has held
firm in refusing to incorporate this concept into its own legal system. The law
allows the court to rule that failure is too minor to have the contract termin-
ated. However, a simple circumvention by limiting the access to termination
via the principle of reasonableness and fairness is not going to work. This
principle does not stretch the exception laid down in art. 6:265 significantly
further.
The provisional conclusion is slightly ambiguous. Dutch law recognizes
a higher threshold for termination – there is an extra requirement added to
failure in performance alone – but the requirement of fundamental non-per-
formance is not accepted in Dutch law.
4 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this contribution is to consider whether the Dutch concept of
‘failure in performance of an obligation’ has been influenced by European and
transnational developments and/or instruments. Two specific developments
have been discussed. First, the recent implementation of art. 7:19a DCC has
39 Dutch Supreme Court 22 July 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4122,NJ 2007/343 (Fisser/Tycho),
par. 5.2.
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been discussed. Second, the widely accepted notion of fundamental non-
performance and its possible effects on Dutch law have been analysed.
Both issues show that the term ‘failure in performance’ cannot be under-
stood and analysed in isolation. The term ‘failure in performance’ and its
European and transnational counterparts ‘breach of contract’ and ‘non-perform-
ance’ have close relationships with concepts such as attribution, default,
impossibility and the remedies performance, damages and termination.
The concept of failure in performance as used in the Dutch Civil Code in
general is not directly influenced by European or transnational developments
or instruments. Courts do not refer to European or transnational instruments
when they apply provisions in which the relevant notion returns.
Related concepts such as default and written notice are influenced by the
European Directive on consumer rights, implemented via art. 7:19a DCC. This
implementation may have its implications for the interpretation of the notion
of failure in performance.
The notion of fundamental non-performance, although present in many
other national legal systems and in European and transnational systems, has
not found its way into the Dutch Civil Code. Nevertheless, art. 6:265 DCC has
its ownway of limiting access to termination as a remedy, though the principle
of easy access to termination prevails according to the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, there is a more general way in which the influence of trans-
national and European instruments finds its way into the Dutch legal environ-
ment more and more convincingly. For many years the CISG has been applic-
able to certain contractual (sales) relationships. The scope of certain European
instruments seems to widen as the years pass and consequently, the influence
of the national codemay decline. Although the draft Regulation on a Common
European Sales Law has been withdrawn, a new, more focused, initiative on
the development of a so-called Digital Single Market is already announced,
which will be accompanied by – inter alia – rules of contract law.40 It is not
clear yet, whether these new rules will be developed on a basis of minimum
or maximum harmonisation. The most recent Directive on consumer rights
is largely based on a principle of maximum harmonisation, which leaves no
serious room for national provisions to be of added value, because they ought
to be replaced or rewritten.
Finally, the comparison and analysis of comparable concepts in national
law and transnational law always triggers language problems. It is not just
a matter of possible misunderstandings in communication. Due to linguistic
confusion, the legal interpretation of terms and its connection to other terms
and concepts can be influenced. The implementation of art. 7:19a DCC shows
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 6 May 2015,
COM(2015) 192, pp. 4, 20.
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that this well-known concern is not obsolete or outdated. This lessonmay even
be the most significant one of this contribution.

